�Ļ�Ӱ��

This article argues that former President Trump’s characterization of the 2021 U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan as “the most embarrassing moment in the history of our country” overlooks the core principles of just war theory — namely jus ad bellum’s requirements of proper authority and reasonable hope for success — and that, by those measures, President Biden made a morally sound decision to end a two-decade conflict whose aims (beyond bringing Osama bin Laden to justice in 2011) had become unattainable, as evidenced by the Afghan National Army’s inability to sustain security, the enormous human toll (6,247 U.S. service members and over 46,000 Afghan civilian deaths), and the $2.31 trillion spent, such that continued belligerence would have been unjustifiable. Furthermore, Morris contends that while tactical execution of the exit might have been imperfect, jus in bello considerations regarding combatant conduct do not undermine the justice of ending the war itself, and instead underscore why ceasing hostilities was the prudent and ethical course — one for which President Biden should be commended rather than blamed.

The piece argues that Iran’s presidential elections are essentially a controlled façade rather than genuine democratic processes. Though President Ebrahim Raisi’s sudden death in May 2024 prompted a new electoral cycle with six vetted candidates, all were affiliated with the regime and loyal to Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei, ensuring little real policy divergence. The Guardian Council filtered out all but hardline male clerics and a nominal reformist, creating the illusion of choice while reinforcing conservative dominance. Moreover, the presidency in Iran holds limited authority — ultimate power resides with Khamenei, who, since 1989, has steadily centralized control in his hands, rendering both elected institutions and their leaders largely symbolic. In short, the article contends that no matter who wins, Iran’s domestic and foreign agendas — especially its nuclear program and regional interventions — will remain unchanged, as they are guided by the Supreme Leader's ideology.

While Israel-Palestine demands global attention — due to its historic and contemporary impact on regional security, military posturing, and governance — the article argues that observers should avoid reducing all Middle Eastern politics to this single conflict. Highlighting events like Morocco’s devastating 2023 earthquake, the Arab Uprisings, and the fight against ISIS, Henne emphasizes that other crises and shifts unfold independently of the Israel-Palestine dynamic. He cautions that too narrow a focus, or what he terms a “reductio ad Israel,” risks neglecting key humanitarian and strategic developments across the region. Ultimately, while Israel-Palestine remains a central issue, analysts must maintain a broad lens to fully comprehend the evolving Middle Eastern landscape.

The author argues that North Korea’s recent behavior — marked by ballistic missile tests and the launch of a military satellite in November 2023 (reportedly aided by Russia) — reflects Pyongyang’s embrace of a “new Cold War” framework, pitting the U.S., Japan and South Korea against China, Russia and North Korea. Kim Jong Un views this emerging bipolar or multipolar global order as advantageous, enabling North Korea to shed its isolation by aligning strategically with Moscow and Beijing. However, both China and Russia continue to exploit North Korea for geopolitical leverage rather than as fully dependable allies. Within this revived Cold War context, Pyongyang’s aggressive military posture — including a nuclear doctrine that explicitly allows first use under certain conditions — poses a heightened security threat on the peninsula.

The article examines Moscow’s strategic balancing act amid rising tensions in the Red Sea, where Russia strives to advance its influence without overt engagement. By maintaining relationships across conflicting parties — including Iran, the Houthis, and Western nations — Russia avoids taking sides, thereby preserving leverage. It emphasizes that while the U.S. and NATO focus on protecting shipping lanes from Houthi attacks, Russia quietly bolsters its regional naval posture, asserting itself as a cautious yet opportunistic actor. Ultimately, the piece argues this hedging strategy enables Russia to reinforce its geopolitical presence in the Red Sea while minimizing direct confrontation risk.

The piece explores Russia’s strategic push to establish naval support centers in the Red Sea through agreements with nations like Sudan—and potentially Eritrea—to secure basing rights. Moscow’s efforts build on its 2022 Maritime Doctrine and longstanding Syrian naval presence, aiming to reinforce naval operations along vital trade routes through the Suez Canal. Despite legal deals, instability in Sudan—marked by coups and factional violence—has delayed full implementation. Meanwhile, Moscow appears to be courting Eritrea as an alternative, harking back to Soviet-era bases on the Dahlak Islands. Russia’s ambitions are rooted in protecting energy exports and maritime trade—roughly 8–10% of Russia’s foreign trade flows through the Suez and Red Sea—while solidifying its influence in the region.

This article reviews the International Court of Justice’s January 11–12, 2024 hearings on South Africa's “probable genocide” allegations against Israel and outlines the court's provisional measures, which the judges largely supported. While legal experts and the ICJ emphasized urgent protections for Gazan civilians and adherence to international law, major Western governments—particularly the U.S., U.K., Germany, and France—dismissed the ruling, continuing to back Israel’s military actions and weapons transfers . Pope Francis urged negotiation and peace, though President Biden did not shift policy. The article also notes wider global reactions: South Africa welcomed the ICJ order, while organizations like the EU and UN human rights experts called for full compliance—some advocating arms embargoes on Israel. In summary, the piece underscores a deep international divide: legal calls for humanitarian protection versus continued political and military support for Israel.

This piece highlights the U.S. military’s need to strengthen land-based Arctic preparedness, noting that while the Air Force and Navy have maintained legacy capabilities, newer challenges require dedicated ground force strategies. The activation of the 11th Airborne Division (Arctic) in June 2022 marks a major step, but the Department of Defense still lacks a fully defined Arctic mission, doctrine, and operational guidance to align with the 2022 National Strategy for the Arctic Region.

Drawing on the author’s own childhood experience in war-torn Bosnia, this reflective piece explores how traumatic memories—like recalling fireworks as gunfire—linger long after the conflict ends. It underscores how early exposure to violence, hatred, and ethnic division in Bosnia (1992–1996), including the longest modern siege in Sarajevo, can imprint deep psychological scars.

This article examines how melting Arctic ice has spurred geopolitical competition over seabed claims and trade routes. Notably, Russia has capitalized on thawing conditions—and weakening Western deterrence—to escalate military presence, including the deployment of nuclear-capable Tu-95 “Bear” bombers armed with long-range cruise missiles near Alaska.